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Privacy Act Expungements:
A Reconsideration

James Gregory Bradsher

"Privacy," according to Justice of the United States
Supreme Court William 0. Douglas, "involves the choice of
the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what
he thinks, what he possesses. The individual," he believed,
"should have the freedom to select for himself the time and
circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and
decide the extent of that sharing."1 For the private
manuscript repository the protection of an individual's right
to privacy, at least that of the donor, presents no
insurmountable problems. Donors may simply purge files in
advance of deposit or place certain restrictions on their
disclosure.
1 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U .S. 323 (1966).
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More vexing is the problem of government records
which contain information that either should not have been
collected in the first place, or that is incorrect. Unfortunately, many government files contain inaccurate information and, infrequently, illegally obtained information. With
respect to such federal--not archival--records, individuals
can generally have the records amended, or have them
expunged, that is, destroyed. Daily, federal records or
portions of them, are destroyed based on the belief that the
right of privacy is more important than the right of
contemporary society as well as posterity to know.
Archivists are aware of the problems of protecting
privacy versus the desire of researchers to have access to
records--the right to privacy vs. the right to know.2 But
what archivists are most likely not aware of is that records
including those scheduled as archival are expunged. What
follows is an analysis of the federal expungement process in
the context of one specific expungement case. This analysis
2 Walter Rundell, Jr. and Bruce F. Adams, "Historians,
Archivists, and the Privacy Issue," Georgia Archive 3 (Winter
1975): 3-15; Alan Reitman, "Freedom of Information and
Privacy: The Civil Libertarian's Dilemma," American
Archivist, 38 (October 1975): 501-508; James Gregory
Bradsher, "Researchers, Archivists and the Access Challenge
of the FBI Records in the National Archives," Midwestern
Archivist 11 (1986): 95-110; Philip P. Mason, "The
Archivist's Responsibility to Researchers and Donors: A
Delicate Balance," in Alonzo L. Hamby and Edward Weldon,
eds., Access to the Papers of Recent Public Figures: The
New Harmony Conference (Bloomington, Indiana: Organization of American Historians for the American Historical
Association-Organization of American Historians-Society of
American Archivists Committee on Historians and
Archivists, 1977), 25-37; Barton J. Bernstein, "A Plea for
Opening the Door," ibid., 83-90. Norman A. Graebner,
"History, Society, and the Right to Privacy," in Rockefeller
Archive Center, The Scholar's Right to Know Versus the
Individual's Right to Privacy. Proceedings of the First
Archive Center Conference, December 5, 1975 (n.p.: Rockefeller Archives Center, n.d.), 20-24.
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is provided for four reasons: first, to acquaint readers with
the right to know, the right to privacy, and their relationship
to the expungement process; second, to help them decide if
expungements of permanently scheduled records are something they can accept; third, to explain why the current law
and procedures governing expungements should be changed;
and fourth, to suggest changes in the manner in which
expungements are handled.
Among the major American democratic principles is the
right of the people to be informed and have the ability to be
informed. Indeed, the right to know is important to the
United States' political system. The Supreme Court and its
justices have continually expressed the importance of free
and open discussion. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
stated that "it is only through free debate and free exchange
of ideas that government remains responsive to the people."3
Justice Douglas wrote that "the vitality of civil and political
institutions in our society depends on free discussion" and
that "full and free discussion has indeed been the first article
of our faith. We have founded our political system on it."4
Just as the right to know is important, so too is the
importance of using records as a means of studying the past,
especially the recent past. In order to know, in order to
conduct an analysis of government activities and judgments
and to influence the correction of government mistakes and
abuses, researchers must have access to information. If
information is withheld, it cannot be acted upon. The
Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is based on this
premise.
"The basic purpose of [the] FOIA," according to the
Supreme Court, "is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to

3 De Jonge v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 353 (1937).
4 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. l (1949) and Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (l.951).
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the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to
the governed."5
While achieving an informed citizenry is a crucial goal,
counterpoised to it are other vital societal aims, including the
protection of personal privacy rights. Indeed, one of the
most important rights of Americans is that of privacy,
defined by Justice Louis D. Brandeis as the right "to be let
alone."6 This right according to Justice Douglas, "is indeed
the beginning of all freedom."7 Neither the Constitution nor
the Bill of Rights nor any amendments explicitly mention
any right to privacy. However, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.a In 1961, the Supr~me Court stated the right
to privacy must be considered a basic constitutional right "no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people."9 ''This notion of privacy," Justice
Douglas observed, "is not drawn from the blue. It emanates
from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which
we live."10 The Supreme Court has recognized that a right
of privacy is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections from govern-

5 National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co. , 437 U .S. 242 (1978).
6 Olmstead v. United States , 277 U.S. 478 (1928).
7 Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 467
(l 952).
8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 656 (1961).
10 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961).
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mental invasions of the sanctity of an individual's home and
the privacies of life, and the Ninth Amendment's protection
of rights, though not enumerated, retained by the people.n
But the right to privacy is not absolute. Justice Brandeis
also stated that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed , must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment."12 The key to this sentence is the word
"unjustifiable."13 Under the Fourth Amendment, privacy is
protected only against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Fourth Amendment, Justice Potter Stewart stated, in
delivering the opinion of the court, "cannot be translated
into a general constitutional 'right of privacy.' That
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of government intrusion. Other provisions of the Constitution," he wrote, "protect personal privacy from other forms
of government invasion. But the protection of a person's
'general' right to privacy . . .is, like the protection of his
property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual states."14 Because the right of privacy is not out
H Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656
(1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U .S. 438 (1928).
13 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 605 (1946).
14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 350, 351 (1967). "I
like my privacy as well as the next one," Justice Hugo L.
Black stated in his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, "but I
am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has the
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific
constitutional provisions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
510 (1965). He opined that there is not a constitutional right
to privacy, believing it was not found in the due process
clause or the Ninth Amendment, nor "any mysterious and
uncertain natural law concept." Also dissenting in the same
case, Justice Potter Stewart stated that "I can find no such
general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other
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of reach of the legislative power, the details of the right of
privacy, and even its very existence, are matters of
legislative control. As Justice Douglas stated in 1952, "There
is room for regulation of the ways and means of invading
privacy ."15
In order to function effectively and exercise their powers
intelligently, governments today require more and more
information and accumulate more and more records.16 Daily
the federal government collects, with legislative approval,
millions of personal details about the lives of American
citizens. Much of this accumulated information about the
attitudes, activities, and performances of individuals is found
in case files.
These case files often contain inaccurate information and
infrequently, illegally obtained information. But even if the
information was legally obtained and is true, it often may
not provide a full and faithful portrait of an individual.
Over time information stored in case files becomes less
relevant to the purposes for which it was collected and often
becomes more misleading. However, once in a case file, the
information can, in a short period of time, attain a
legitimacy and authority that is lacking in other less formal
types of files.17 Like the agencies that created the files, the
files themselves often have a life far beyond the lifespan of
individuals who are the subjects of the files.
part of the Constitution; or in any case ever before decided
by this Court."
15 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
16 James Gregory Bradsher, "A Brief History of the
Growth of Federal Records, Archives, and Information,
1789-1985," Government Publications Review 13 . ( 1986):
491-505.
17 Stanton
Wheeler,
"Problems
and
Issues
in
Record-Keeping," in Stanton Wheeler, ed., On Record: Files
and Dossiers in American Life (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1969), 5, 23; Jerry M. Rosenberg, The Death of
Privacy (New York: Random House, 1969), 145.
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Although the government can legally invade privacy in
the process of gathering information about citizens, some
protection is afforded. The due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments impose requirements of procedural fairness on the federal and state governments when
they act to invade a person's privacy.ts The federal
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, taken
together, set forth the conditions under which information
impinging on privacy can be collected, used, and disseminated.19 When the federal government wrongfully invades
privacy, an individual, acting under the due process concept
and the Privacy Act itself, can remedy the wrongs in several
ways, including requesting expungement- -that is, destruction of information in records or the records themselves.
Because of the concerns about what information finds its
way into government records, the growing computerization
of files, and potential and actual invasions of privacy, many
civil libertarians in the late 1960s and early 1970s called for
a law that would allow a person to challenge the accuracy of
information about him in a government dossier and, if the
information was improperly obtained, provide a mechanism
for its destruction.20 This is in keeping with the legal

18 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U .S. 53 (1957); Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Willner v.
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); In
re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
19 The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (PL 89-487)
and the Privacy Act of 1974 (PL 93-502) are codified in 5
u.s.c. 552.
20 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York:
Atheneum, 1967), 387-388; Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on
Privacy: Computers , Data Banks, and Dossiers (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1971), passim; Aryeh
Neier, Dossier: The Secret Files They Keep on You (New
York: Stein and Day, 1975), '186-199.
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maxim that for every wrong, there should be a remedy.
Congress, concerned about privacy, made such provisions in
the Privacy Act of 1974.
The Privacy Act was enacted "to promote governmental
respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all
departments and agencies of the executive branch. . .to
observe certain constitutional rules in the computerization,
collection, management, use and disclosure of personal
information about individuals."21 It provides that no agency
shall maintain records describing how an individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and provides that
only such information as is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a purpose of the agency shall be maintained. It
also allows individuals to correct or delete improper or
inaccurate material.22
The Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, provides
the conditions under which federal records can be destroyed

21 U. S. Cong., Senate, Protecting Individual Privacy in
Federal Gathering, Use, and Disclosure: Report to Accompany S.3418, 93d Cong., 2d sess., S. Report 93-1138 1974, I.
22 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(l),(7). "Each agency that maintains a
system of records. . .shall permit the individual to request
amendment of a record pertaining to him, and promptly,
either make any correction of any portion thereof which the
individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or
complete; or inform the individual of its refusal to amend
the record in accordance with his request. . . ." 5 U.S.C
552a(d)(2); Several courts have construed the act to authorize
expungements, as well as amendments. R.R. v. Dept. of
Army , 482 F.Supp 770 (D.D.C. 1980); Churchwell v. United
States, 554 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976); White v. Civil Service
Commission, 589 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Certain types of
records can be exempted, such as criminal law enforcement
files. 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
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and establishes detailed procedures for destruction.23 It
authorizes the archivist of the United States to determine if
records have sufficient administrative, legal, fiscal, evidential, or informational values to warrant their continued
retention. Under the Privacy Act agencies determine if
records are to be expunged, notwithstanding the Federal
Records Act. Soon after the adoption of the Privacy Act,
questions were raised about the archivist's lack of involvement in making expungement decisions. A circuit court,
when viewing the two acts, expressly held that the Federal
Records Act must yield to statutory or constitutional rights
elsewhere guaranteed, stating that "this general statutory
command [the provisions of the Federal Records Act] must
bow to them when they are more specific, as of course it
must bow to the Constitution."2•
Federal courts have found that expungement of records
is, in certain circumstances, a permissible remedy for an
agency's violation of the Privacy Act.25 Two cases have
expressly held this to be true when an agency violated the
act's prohibition on maintenance of records describing an
individual's exercise of rights guaranteed by the First

23 44 U.S.C. 3301-3314 sets forth the procedures and
conditions under which federal records may be destroyed or
otherwise disposed. It ends by stating that "the procedures
prescribed by this chapter are exclusive, and records of the
United States Government may not be alienated or destroyed
except under this chapter." 44 U.S.C. 3314. This is a
contradiction to the Privacy Act expungement process. For a
discussion of the disposition of Federal records, see James
Gregory Bradsher, "An Administrative History of the
Disposal of Federal Records, 1789-1949," Provenance 3 (Fall
1985): 1-21, and "An Administrative History of the Disposal
of Federal Records, 1950-1985," ibid. , 4 (Fall 1986): 49-63.
24 Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1236 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
.
1975).
25 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Amendment.26 It is equally well established that expungement of records is a proper remedy in an action brought
under the Constitution.27 Just last year the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed that
"document destruction, if feasible, is the ultimate relief
available in a Privacy Act suit challenging the accuracy of
agency records."28 Thus, federal records can be, have been,
and will be expunged with complete legal approval.
Federal archives, however, cannot be expunged. In
drafting the Privacy Act, Congress specifically prohibited
their destruction under the act.29 That archival material was
exempt from almost all provisions of the Privacy Act was
the result of three arguments that National Archives made to
Congress. First, the National Archives argued that archives
were not current records used to make determinations about
individuals which could adversely affect them. Second, it
was argued that the integrity of archives could not be
maintained if individuals could amend them. "The fact that
26 Clarkson v. Internal Revenue Service, 687 F.2d 1368,
1376-1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Albright v. United States, 631
F.2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
27 Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975);
Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Matadure
Corp v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
28 Melvin D. Reuber v. United States of America and
Litton Industries, Inc., No. 84-5880, D.C. Cir. September 18,
1987.
29 5 U.S.C 552a(l)(3). As the House report notes, "a
basic archival rule holds that archivists may not remove or
amend information in any records placed m their custody.
The principle of maintaining the integrity of records is
considered one of the most important rules of professional
conduct. It is important because historians quite properly
want to learn the true condition of past government records
when doing research; they frequently find the fact that a
record was "inaccurate' is at least as important as the fact
that a record was accurate." U.S. Cong., House of
Representatives, Privacy Act of 1974: Report together with
Additional Views to accompany H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d
sess. H. rep. 93-1416, 1974, 21.
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records are incorrect," according to James E. O'Neill, former
deputy archivist of the United States, "is as much a part of
history as if they were correct."30 And, third, the National
Archives argued that there were sufficient restrictions
imposed by statute, the transferring agency, and the
archivist, to protect individual privacy.
"The foundation of our arguments," O'Neill observed in
1976, "is the demonstrated tradition of the National Archives
of assuming the ethical responsibility of protecting the
privacy of individuals. It has always been a major part of
our business," he maintained, "to balance the legitimate need
to protect individuals from unwarranted invasions of their
privacy against the equally legitimate demands for access to
information. Our record in this area was a major factor in
Congress' decision to grant the National Archives the
exemption from the Act."31
Because ninety-eight percent of all federal records are
temporary in nature, their expungement, before their
scheduled disposal date, generally poses no problem.32
Congress, however, neglected to address the issue of
expunging permanently scheduled records that would become
archives. They can be destroyed. So, is there a problem
when permanently valuable records are expunged, in whole
or in part, before they become archives? The answer
depends upon a variety of factors, including what information is contained in the records, who is involved, .the
importance of the records to posterity, and societal views on
privacy.

30 James E. O'Neill, "Federal Law and Access to Federal
Records," in Hamby and Weldon, eds., Access to the Papers
of Recent Public Figures, 41.
31 Ibid. , 41.
32 For a discussion of what percentage of records are
permanent, see James Gregory Bradsher, "When One Percent
Means A Lot: The Percentage of Permanent Records in the
National Archives," Organiz~tion of American Historians
Newsletter 13 (May 1985): 20-21.
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Rather than attempting to delve deeper into the legal and
theoretical aspects of expungements, it is more worthwhile to
approach the subject from a personal perspective, because
expungements involve real people. Because of the nature of
the expungement process, there has been little written about
it or the people who have been involved in the process.33
But it is the human element that allows for a greater
appreciation of the complexities involved in the expungement of permanently scheduled records. A case that allows
insight into the process concerns Leland Stowe, a Pulitzer
Prize winning journalist, who in 1986 donated the records
relating to the expungement of his Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) file to the Bentley Historical Library at
the University of Michigan. Not everything can be told
about the Stowe expungement case, primarily because some
of the information in his file was not made available to him,
and, more importantly, to protect the privacy of third
parties. However, what can be made public is illustrative of
the problems involved in the expungement process, will
serve as a basis to address concerns about expungements, and .
will assist in making a decision about .whether the current
law should be changed.
"Once one of the most celebrated foreign correspondents
of his time, Leland Stowe (I 899)", it was written in a
January 1985 Ann Arbor Observer article, "now passes
practically unnoticed through the streets of Ann Arbor."34
The name Leland Stowe means nothing to most Americans
today, even in his hometown, but during the 1930s and
1940s; he was among the most successful and most admired

33 For an account of one person's excursion through the
expungement process, see Penn Kimball, The File (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) and Penn T.
Kimball v. Department of State, Civil Action No. 84-3795,
U.S.D.C. Southern District of New York.
34 Raymond Stock, "The Extraordinary Career of Leland
Stowe," Ann Arbor Observer, (January 1985): 37-45.
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foreign correspondents.ss Working for the New York Herald
Tribune, Stowe covered the League of Nations between 1927
and 1931 and the end of the Spanish dictatorship and
founding of the Spanish Republic from 1929 to 1931. For
his 1929 coverage of the Paris Reparations Commission, he
received the Pulitzer Prize. In 1933 he covered the
Reichstag fire trial in Berlin and published his first book,
Nazi Germany Means War. Returning from Europe in 1935,
he became a roving Western Hemisphere correspondent and
then returned to Spain on leave of absence in 193 7, and
again in 1938, to cover the plight of the homeless and
orphans from the Spanish Civil War.
In September 1939 Stowe joined the Chicago Daily News
and went to Finland in December when that country was
invaded by Russia. The following year he covered the
German takeover of Norway and wrote a book about it, No
Other Road to Freedom. In 1942 he became the first western
correspondent to spend time with Russian combat forces.
During the war he spent thirty-four months overseas
traveling with the armies of seven different nations,
reporting in forty-four countries and colonies on four
continents, and in the process became one of the premier
war reporters of the era. By the end of the war, he had won
virtually every major award for foreign reporting and
received honorary degrees from three universities, including
Harvard.
Returning to the United States in 1944, Stowe published
another war book, They Shall Not Sleep, became a
correspondent for the American Broadcasting Corporation
radio network, and wrote for the New York Post syndicate.
He also did commentary for the Mutual Broadcasting System.
In 1946 he published While Time Remains, condemning the
35 Biographical information on Stowe came from a draft
copy of "Leland Stowe," an entry prepared by Jack
Schnedler, The Dictionary of Literary Biography, and Stock,
"The Extraordinary Career of Leland Stowe," Ann Arbor
Observer, 37-45.

14
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decision to use the atomic bomb against civilians and calling
for world cooperation, even world government, to control
nuclear weapons. In 1949, he warned in Target You of
Soviet territorial ambitions and discussed them again in his
1952 Conquest by Terror: The Story of Satellite Europe.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stowe held a
variety of positions, including director of Radio Free
Europe's News and Information Service (1952-1954). In
1955 he began a twenty-one year part-time career as a
roving editor for Reader's Digest, and the following year
began a fourteen year tenure as a professor of journalism at
the University of Michigan. He continued writing books,
publishing his eighth in 1984.
In 1979, while assembling his papers for donation to the
Mass Communications History Center in Madison, Wisconsin,
Stowe wrote the FBI, under the FOIA, for information
relating to himself. He believed, because of the views he
had expressed during the Spanish Civil War, that he must
have been investigated.36 He was eventually supplied with
116 pages of materials, most of it from an internal security
investigative case file. The file covered thirty years,
beginning in 1943 with an internal security investigation of
Stowe's activities on the Eastern Front and ending in March
1972 with documents relating to his unsuccessful attempt to
interview J. Edgar Hoover for a favorable piece on the FBI
Laboratory that he was writing for the Reader's Digest.
These latter documents indicate he was refused an
interview with Hoover because of derogatory information in
the files. That is, he was considered not worthy to see
Hoover. What was this derogatory information? The documents Stowe obtained revealed that he had been the subject
of an internal security investigation because "he was
36 Stowe's typewritten chronology of his dealings with
the FBI, 6 December 1982, in Leland Stowe Papers,
Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library,
University of Michigan, I. Hereafter cited as Stowe Papers.
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associated with communist front groups and activities in the
World War II period, and also expressed sympathy and
support toward the Soviet Union." Additionally, the file
indicated that during a radio broadcast in August 1947,
while discussing the Federal Employees Loyalty Program,
Stowe "made statements implying improper actions on the
part of the FBI." His comments prompted Hoover to write a
letter of protest to the Mutual Broadcasting Company.37
The release of the file was quite enlightening to Stowe.
He had not been aware the FBI had been monitoring his
activities and personal communications.38 He believed that
the file was riddled with factual errors and misrepresentations, and he was disturbed that the file represented him as a
person of uncertain loyalty to the American government, of
being unduly admiring of the accomplishments of the Soviet
government, and as being an associate of others of similar
disposition. The allegations in the file, Stowe realized, had
been disseminated and had a negative impact on his life. He
believed that what he once considered unrelated setbacks in
his professional life in the 1940s and l 950s--loss of a series
of lucrative speaking engagements and a failure to obtain a
routine security clearance to continue a job with Radio Free
Europe--were the result of the distribution of this
derogatory information about him.39
Believing that the "true" story should be told, Stowe
attempted to have the FBI amend his file. On 30 .A ugust
1980 he sent the FBI over seven hundred pages of documents
giving his version of events. A month later the FBI
informed Stowe that certain information maintained in their
37 Copy of FBI memo (FBI file l 00-192690-31) from M.
A. Jones to Mr. Bishop, February 27, 1972, Stowe Papers.
38 Michael V. Smith, "The Problem of Determining
Motives in FBI Surveillance of Journalists and the Case of
Leland Stowe," a paper prepared at the University of
Michigan's Department of Communication, [1984], 6, 7, 16
n. 11. Stowe Papers.
39 Ibid ., 8.
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files was exempt from the correction and amendment
provisions of the Privacy Act, but that it was their policy to
consider each request on an individual basis in order to
reach an equitable determination consistent with the best
interests of both the individual and the government. As for
his documents, Stowe was told that the information
contained in his file was "an accurate recording of what was
furnished to us by several sources, and is completely relevant
to the purpose for which it was collected." However, he was
informed that "in view of the age and nature of this material
its continued retention is unnecessary, and could be
destroyed in its entirety." Stowe was told that if he wanted
the file destroyed he would have to ask that it be done:to
Stowe wrote the FBI on 6 November 1980 to ascertain
what would be destroyed. The FBI responded two weeks
later, informing him that the destruction of FBI records
concerning him would include index cards, one investigative ·
file of which he was the subject, and all references in other
files identifiable with him.41 Although he "felt a certain
obligation to preserve what might be considered an
important historical record," he "believed it likely that the
data might contribute to a future history that would be
insensitive to the FBl's distortions and to the lives of those
who--like himself--had been unknowing and essentially
innocent victims of the agency." Unless the file could be
amended, "Stowe believed the future would be served better
by the file's destruction than by its preservation."42 On 24
November 1980, Stowe wrote the FBI approving the
destruction. 43
40 Thomas H. Bresson to Leland Stowe, 30 September
1980, Stowe Papers.
41 Thomas H. Bresson to Leland Stowe, 19 November
1980, ibid.
42 Smith, "The Problem of Determining Motives in FBI
Surveillance of Journalists and the Case of Leland Stowe," 9.
43 Leland Stowe to Thomas H. Bresson, 24 November
1980, Stowe Papers.
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Because the complete file was to be expunged, the FBI,
acting under National Archives regulations, requested that
the National Archives document that the records would be
destroyed.•• Several National Archives appraisers looked at
the file during the winter of 1981-1982. Most of them
believed the file should not be destroyed. Acting on their
advice, James E. O'Neill, then assistant archivist for
presidential libraries and director of the National Archives
Records Appraisal Task Force, wrote Stowe in hopes of
discouraging him from his disposal request. Stowe was told
that "the destruction of this case file would create an
enormous gap in the historical record of the FBI. Your
professional career," O'Neill wrote, "would be of considerable
interest to anyone doing a study of 20th century American
journalism, the molding of American public opinion during
WWII and the early Cold War era, and how the government
monitored dissent during the 1940s." Stowe was informed
that if he withdrew his disposal request the file would not be
opened to the public until the year 2022, fifty years after
the case file was closed.45
"In its present state," Stowe wrote O'Neill, "my case file
is inevitably one-sided; perhaps, in some degree unavoidably
so--but much more so because of the Bureau agents'
acceptance of charges made against me without any recorded
effort to check up on their validity or veracity." Stowe
wrote that in the file he had found numerous unverified
allegations of his being "a Red, a Communist or pro-Soviet
44 The National Archives regulations are set forth in
GSA Bulletin FPMR B-74 Archives and Records, Subject:
Disposal of Federal records in response to requests made
pursuant to the Privacy Act, 17 January 1978. These
regulations allow federal agencies to expunge up to 99.9
percent of any record without National Archives involvement. If complete destruction is requested, agencies must
involve the National Archives in the process, so the
destruction can be documented.
45 James E. O'Neill to Leland Stowe, 11 March 1982,
Stowe Papers.
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fellow-traveler" and "also many easily disprovable reports
and interpretations concerning my journalistic writings and
ideological attitudes. These discrepancies," he wrote, "are
especially noteworthy because the agents' reports were totally
lacking any counter-balancing or refutory facts--readily
available at the time--about my professional and public
career." His file, he believed, was "demonstrably distortive--frequently extremely so--of my journalistic record
and all factual evidence of my dedication to democratic
principles and my lifelong loyalty to our American form of
government is omitted."
Therefore, Stowe continued, if his file was to be
preserved for historical purposes, "I firmly believe that my
own counter-balancing documents should be included.
Elemental justice," he believed, "would make such inclusion
a prerequisite, and historically indispensable. Should NARS
[National Archives and Records Service] wish to preserve
these documents--together with my FBI file for future
historical reference--! would welcome having the combined
materials ultimately become available, among the Archives'
important and most useful collections--even if not until the
year 2022 AD." If the National Archives would not do this,
he wanted his file destroyed.•6
During the summer of 1982, the National Archives
informed Stowe that he could not attach material to his file
when it was accessioned. Thus, he desired his file to be
destroyed. The next summer the archivist of the United
States "approved" the file's destruction.•7

46 Leland Stowe to James E. O'Neill, 29 March 1982,
ibid.
47 Early in 1986, Stowe was informed the FBI was
processing his request and that the file would be destroyed
in the near future and that he would be notified when the
expungement was completed. James E. O'Neill to Leland
Stowe, 27 February 1986, ibid.
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Stowe's case is an excellent example of the dilemma
faced by those dealing with the right to know, the right to
privacy, and the expungement process. What was lost and
gained in the destruction of his file? Stowe gained the
satisfaction of knowing that what he believed was a file full
of false allegations, errors of fact and interpretation, and
misrepresentations, was destroyed. His reputation, and his
privacy, will be protected. It could be argued that nothing
was lost by the destruction. After all, other FBI files will
reveal its internal security activities--legal and illegal. With
respect to Stowe, jf someone was interested in him and his
encounter with the FBI, they could obtain information
elsewhere. Stowe himself did not think his case file
particularly important, writing the National Archives that
until it contacted him, he considered "its value seemingly
very slight."48
Three things were lost by the destruction of Stowe's file.
First was unique information about Stowe. Second was
evidence of an FBI investigation of a prominent journalist.
And third was evidence, along with his own papers, to show
the impact of the FBI on his life. Had Stowe received a
security clearance he might have assumed an even higher
position with Radio Free Europe, and thus, the last
thirty-five years of his life might have been very different.
The right to know was sacrificed to Leland Stowe's right
to privacy. Should it have been? In the process of
protecting privacy should the eventual right to know be
sacrificed? Should the FBI have been allowed to destroy the
Stowe case file? The Stowe case is not an isolated example.
Inaccurate or illegally obtained information, of varying
importance, contained in permanently scheduled records, is
being destroyed to protect privacy rights on a continuing
basis. In most instances, no great harm results from such
expungements. In part, this is because of the nature of the
48 Leland Stowe to James E. O'Neill, 29 March 1982,
ibid.
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information; in part, it is because of the belief that great
weight should be given to privacy, since it is basically, if not
legally, a natural right and not so easily given up to society
without exceptional cause.49 In most instances, the right to
know is not an exceptional cause, either today or for the
sake of history, but there are exceptions.
During the Nixon administration, the White House had
the FBI illegally wiretap seventeen American citizens that it
believed were responsible for leaks. Subsequently, the public
learned of these wiretaps, and Congress held hearings about
them.so Some of those who were wiretapped wanted the
related records made public, while others wanted to keep the
contents of the files private, and one person wanted his file
expunged. What if all seventeen individuals had asked to
have their wiretap files expunged, based on the fact that
they should not have been wiretapped? If the files were
destroyed to protect their privacy and to right a government
wrong, will history know? The answer is no. If there is no
record of the misdeed, then for all practical purposes it did
not happen. Is this what archivists and historians want?

49 On privacy as a natural right, see Bernard Schwartz,
A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. Part
III. Rights of the Person (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1968), 169-258; Louis Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (15
December 1890): 193-220; Charles Grove Haines, The
Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1930), 85; Henry Steele Commager,
"Constitutional History and the Higher Law," in The
Constitution Reconsidered, edited for the American Historical
Association by Conyers Read, revised edition with a new
preface by Richard B. Morris (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1968), 230, 232.
50 David Wise, The American Police State: The Government Against the People (New York: Vintage Books, 1976),
31-95.

Privacy Act Expungements

21

The answers to the above questions lie, for the most
part, in how the right of privacy is viewed in relation to the
right to know--the desire of historians and others to have
raw data on which to base their judgments of events,
activities, and people. On one hand privacy is an important
right, not so easily sacrificed without good reason and with
due process. Yet, there are instances when it is necessary to
know now as well as in the future when an individual's
privacy must be sacrificed for the greater good of society.
For example, if records document individual or a pattern of
government abuses and nobody knows, no action can be
taken to correct the situation. With information available to
it, society can, through one or more branches of government,
mandate changes.
Under current expungement procedures, historically
valuable information is legally destroyed. Professional
archival judgments carry no weight in the process o.f
balancing privacy with the right to know, because under the
law the decision whether or not to expunge does not lie with
archivists, but with the individuals and agencies involved.
Thus, there is a need to change the way expungements are
handled if permanently scheduled records of exceptional
value are to be preserved and eventually made available for
research.
The easiest solution, though perhaps not the best, would
be to have Congress change the Federal Records Act to
provide that once records have been appraised as having
enduring value, they be considered archival, and thus not
subject to expungement. This, of course, would mean a
change in the United States' definition of archives, much
along the lines of the French Archival Law of 1979 that
provides that permanently valuable records become archives
the minute they are created or received.SI

51 Michael Duchein, "Archives in France: The New
Legislation of 1979," Archivaria, 11 (Winter 1980-81 ): 128.
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If there is to be a change, it must be made within a
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and appropriately protects all interests. The "determination of the
propriety of an order directing expungement;" according to a
circuit court, "involves a balancing of interests; the harm
caused to an individual by the existence of any record must
be weighed against the utility to the Government of their
maintenance."52 The court was thinking in terms of current
administrative usefulness to the government, not future uses
in terms of informational and evidential values. As the
expungement process now works, federal agencies, in
approving expungement requests, are protecting the interests
of privacy, but not the interests of those who want to know.
Assuming that in some instances the right to know takes
precedence over the right to privacy, who should be
responsible for making the decision--the choice between
retention and destruction? Federal agency personnel should
be excluded for the same reason they are excluded from
having the final say on appraisal judgments--because they
are, for the most part, not as experienced or as well trained
as federal archivists in judging the archival value of records.
If federal agencies are eliminated, three choices remain: the
legislature, the courts, and archivists.
Congress, although responsible for amending the Privacy
Act, cannot directly involve itself in the expungement
process. "The conflict between the general public's right to
know what its government is doing and the individual's right
to have some control over the dissemination of personal
information held by the government is an extremely difficult
one to resolve" according to one legal scholar. "And it is
doubtful," he adds, "that any legislative formula could offer
more than general guidelines for handling the kaleidoscopic
factual problems that are certain to arise."53 This was
written four years before Congress enacted the Privacy Act.

52 Paton v. La Pradae, 524 F. 2d 868 (3d Cir. 1975).
53 Miller, The Assault on Privacy, 153-154.
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It encompasses a great deal of truth. There are so many

situations that Congress could not adopt legislation covering
every specific situation. Thus, realistically, Congress can
only amend the act to provide some general guidelines
covering expungements of permanently scheduled records.
If the Privacy Act is amended, it should provide that
agencies must have the approval of the National Archives
before any portion of permanently scheduled or as yet
unscheduled records are destroyed under an expungement
request. Such a provision would be based on the premise
that archivists are better qualified than agency officials to
determine the historical value of records and are adequately
trained to balance privacy and the right to know. If the
National Archives believes that records should not ·be
expunged, in whole or part, the involved citizen should be
informed and given the opportunity to appeal the decision,
or possibly to suggest a partial expungement, such as name
and other personal identifiers, or to agree to keeping the file
closed for an appropriate length of time. The person could
be given the opportunity to amend the record, within reason,
and the record would either be opened at its normal time or
after an extended period of time, or the individual could be
allowed to attach a statement indicating where countervailing
evidence is located.5• These options are in keeping with a
federal court's finding that expungement is a "versatile tool"
where "expungement of only some records, from some
Government files, may be enough, as may the placing of
restrictions on how the information contained in tbe records
may be used. It is a tool which must be applied with close
attention to the peculiar facts in each case."55 If a
compromise cannot be reached by both parties, then the
decision should be rendered by the courts.

54 For a brief discussion of a person's ability to dispute
information, see Regina C. McGranery, "A Donor's View," in
Hamby and Weldon, eds., Access to the Papers of Recent
Public Figures, 54-56.
SS Chastain v. Kelley , 510 'F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Courts frequently have been called upon to determine
whether privacy exists as a legal right and, if so, then to
what extent and under what conditions. Constitutional rights
of free speech, press, and assembly are often set up in
opposition to privacy rights and the courts called upon to
strike a delicate and often difficult balance between privacy
concerns, on the one hand, and constitutionally protected
interests in free expression, on the other.56 Expungement
cases could be handled by the courts through two methods.
The first would be to let the courts review the documentation and render a decision. If the decision was unsatisfactory to either the National Archives or the individual, then a
court hearing could be held, and its decision appealed to a
higher court if necessary.
Privacy expungements involve complex and subtle issues.
They are issues on which archivists can disagree, both as to
whether the right to know or the right to privacy should be
given greater weight and as to what records are of such
importance that they are worthy of being preserved, despite
being the subject of a legitimate expungement request. As
the federal expungement process now works, archivists have
no influence in the process. The decision to expunge
permanently scheduled records completely--just one step
removed from being archives--is left in the hands of the
agencies and their officials who have custody of the records.
These officials, in most instances, do not mind destroying
records--not only to protect the rights of citizens but also to
protect their agency from lawsuits for having certain
information and not destroying it.

56 Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), Chapter 3,
"Rights in Conflict," 55-82; Paul Bender, "Privacy," in
Norman Dorsen, ed., Our Endangered Rights: The ACLU
Report on Civil Liberties Today (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1984), 237-258.
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Under the current expungement process not only is
history shortchanged, but the present society's ability to
know fully what its government is doing to its citizens is
also. Thus, there is a need to change the current process, to
amend the Privacy Act along the lines outlined earlier. By
doing so, by bringing archivists into the process, a balance
can be struck between the right to know and the right to
privacy. Neither is an absolute, especially when placed in
opposition to the other. But while gaining a greater role in
the expungement process, archivists should remember that
while the right to know, not only today but also tomorrow,
is a political right that is very important to a democratic
form of government, the right to privacy is certainly one
that should not be sacrificed without exceptional cause.

James Gregory Bradsher is an archivist at the National
Archives and Records Administration. The views expressed in this
article are his own and not neceasarily those of his agency.

